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Explanatory Synthesis and Rule Synthesis:   
A Comparative Civil Law and Common Law Analysis 
 
By Michael D. Murray
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
In legal analysis, there are two methods of synthesis of precedent cases: 
rule synthesis and explanatory synthesis. Rule synthesis refers to the 
use of multiple authorities for the purpose of determining what is the 
prevailing law—the prevailing legal rule—on an issue.
1
 Explanatory 
synthesis refers to the use of multiple authorities for the purpose of 
demonstrating how the law should be interpreted and applied in the 
present circumstances based on how it has been interpreted and 
applied in past circumstances.
2
 Explanatory synthesis does not seek to 
                         
   Associate Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. 
Professor Murray thanks Professors Nancy M. Burkoff (Pittsburgh), Grace C. 
Tonner (UC Irvine), Dr. Feridun Yenisey (Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi, Faculty of 
Law), and the faculty and participants in the 21st Century Legal Skills 
Conference at Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi, Istanbul, Turkey, June 2011, for their 
comments on this paper.  He also thanks Kathleen Burch (John Marshall-
Atlanta), Tracy McGaugh (Touro), Mark Wojcik (John Marshall-Chicago), and 
Feridun Yenisey for their excellent assistance and coordination efforts with 
the conference. 
1  Rule synthesis is an inductive synthesis of authorities—including, but 
not limited to, judicial opinions—found to be on point and controlling of a 
legal question in order to accurately determine and state the prevailing rule 
of law that governs the issue. See, e.g., Michael D. Murray, Rule Synthesis 
and Explanatory Synthesis: A Socratic Dialogue Between IREAC and TREAT, 
8 LEG. COM. & RHET. 217, 226-229 (2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1875903 
[Murray, Rule Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis]; MICHAEL D. MURRAY & 
CHRISTY H. DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS chs. 2, 5, 6 (2009) 
[MURRAY & DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS]; MICHAEL D. MURRAY 
& CHRISTY H. DESANCTIS, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING AND ORAL ADVOCACY 
Appx. A (2009) [MURRAY & DESANCTIS, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING]. For 
additional information on the use of syntheses of multiple authorities to 
formulate the legal rule, see RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING 
AND LEGAL WRITING chs. 10-13 (5th ed. 2005); DEBORAH A. SCHMEDEMANN & 
CHRISTINA L. KUNZ, SYNTHESIS: LEGAL READING, REASONING, AND WRITING 
chs. 4, 6, 9 (3d ed. 2007); HELENE S. SHAPO, ELIZABETH FAJANS & MARY R. 
FALK, WRITING AND ANALYSIS IN THE LAW ch. 2(IV), ch. 5(III) (4th ed. 1999); 
Terrill Pollman, Building A Tower of Babel or Building a Discipline? Talking 
About Legal Writing, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 887, 909-10 (2002). 
2  Explanatory synthesis is a qualitative method of analysis of legal 
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determine what the law is, but how the law operates. Explanatory 
synthesis is a method of analysis and advocacy that demonstrates how 
the law will or should produce an outcome in a certain situation based 
on inductive syntheses of authorities that reveal how the law has 
operated in past situations. It also is a method of modern legal rhetoric 
that constructs knowledge and understanding of the role of precedents 
on the legal issue, persuading the audience as to the correctness or 
superiority of the attorney's knowledge and understanding of how the 
law works, and seeking to motivate the audience to act in the 
rhetorical situation of the discourse. 
 
In comparative study of common law and civilian legal analysis, many 
scholars have noted a convergence in the two systems' use of precedent 
cases.
3
 Although common law legal theory historically has started from 
                                                                   
authorities, especially precedent cases, and a method of legal rhetoric that 
uses induction to formulate from multiple authorities the principles 
concerning how a legal test or legal standard is to be interpreted and applied. 
For background on explanatory synthesis, see Michael D. Murray, Rule 
Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis, 8 LEG. COM. & RHET. at 234-40; 
MURRAY & DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS at ch. 6; MURRAY & 
DESANCTIS, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING at Appx. A. See also sections II(B), V, 
and VI, infra. 
3  Many scholars have noted a convergence, e.g., Derek Beach, BETWEEN 
LAW & POLITICS: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
JUSTICE & EU MEMBER STATES 17 (2001); Mauro Cappelletti, The Doctrine of 
Stare Decisis and the Civil Law: A Fundamental Difference - or No Difference 
at All?, in FESTSCHRIFT ZWEIGERT 387-88 (1981); D. Neil MacCormick & 
Robert S. Summers, INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
(1997); John Henry Merryman & David S. Clark, COMPARATIVE LAW: 
WESTERN EUROPEAN & LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 551-86 (1978); 
Konrad Zweigert et al., AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 256, 259 (3d 
ed. 1998); Louis F. Del Duca, Developing Global Transnational 
Harmonization Procedures for the Twenty-First Century: The Accelerating 
Pace of Common and Civil Law Convergence, 42 TEX. INT'L L.J. 625, 641 
(2007); Thomas Lundmark, Interpreting Precedents: A Comparative Study, 
46 AM. J. COMP. L. 211, 214-18 (1998) (book review); John H. Merryman, On 
the Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil Law and the Common Law, 17 
STAN. J. INT'L L. 357, 358 (1981), but the exact meaning and significance of 
the convergence in the use of precedent cases remains a matter of debate. 
Compare Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Foreword, in 1 Alexander Layton & 
Hugh Mercer, EUROPEAN CIVIL PRACTICE (2d ed. 2004); with Vivian 
Grosswald Curran, Re-Membering Law in the Internationalizing World, 34 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 93 (2005) [Curran, Re-Membering Law] (appearances of 
convergence are deceiving because the different legal and judicial culture of 
different systems and jurisdictions disguises the true meaning of the uses of 
precedent observed in different common law and civilian legal systems). 
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a position that judges are fully competent to create law and change the 
law through their adjudication of cases and the judicial opinions they 
write,
4
 and civilian theory historically has started from a position that 
judges are not empowered to create and change the law enacted by the 
legislature but rather are to read and apply the existing law to new 
cases,
5
 the practice of tribunals within the two families of legal 
analysis
6
 has not reflected clear distinctions in the approach to and use 
of precedent. Civilian judges refer to case law and acknowledge the 
persuasive effect of precedent on their determinations,
7
 and common 
law judges have become more civilian in their respect for legislative 
authority to enact laws that determine cases.
8
 A common law approach 
                         
4  See Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a 
Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 47 (2002); Henry H. 
Drummonds, The Dance of Statutes and the Common Law: Employment, 
Alcohol, and other Torts, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 939, 970 (2000); Melvin 
Aron Eisenberg, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 1 (1988); Michael 
McHugh, The Law-Making Function of the Judicial Process, 62 AUSTL. L.J. 
15, 16 (1988). 
5 Wayne R. Barnes, Contemplating a Civil Law Paradigm for a Future 
International Commercial Code, 65 LA. L. REV. 677, 717-26, 730-31 (2005); 
Mark A. Drumbl, Amalgam in the Americas: A Law School Curriculum for 
Free Markets and Open Borders, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1053, 1066-69 (1998); 
William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil Law (Codified and 
Uncodified), 60 LA. L. REV. 677 (2000). 
6  The two families of legal analysis, broadly drawn, are the civil law 
family and the common law family. The term ―family‖ is hardly 
distinguishing, because within each family are some fairly diverse siblings. 
There are separate traditions within the civil law family—e.g., the Germanic, 
Roman-Latinate, and Nordic traditions—and within the Common Law family 
are the British, United States, Canadian, Australian, and other 
Commonwealth and former Commonwealth countries‘ methods of analysis. 
7 JOSEPH DAINOW, THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND DOCTRINE IN 
CIVIL LAW AND MIXED JURISDICTIONS (1974); MACCORMICK & SUMMERS, 
supra n. 4; ATHANASSIOS YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW SYSTEM § 29, 
at 77 (1971); James L. Dennis, Interpretation and Application of the Civil 
Code and the Evaluation of Judicial Precedent, 54 LA. L. REV. 1 (1993); Vincy 
Fon & Francesco Parisi, Judicial Precedents in Civil Law Systems: A 
Dynamic Analysis, 26 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 519 (2006); R. Moreno, Scott v. 
Cokern: Of Precedent, Jurisprudence Constante, and the Relationship 
Between Louisiana Commercial Laws and Louisiana Pledge Jurisprudence, 
10 TUL. EUR. & CIVIL L. FORUM 31-60 (1995). 
8 MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS (1994); 
Carl Baudenbacher, Some Remarks on the Method of Civil Law, 34 TEX. INT'L 
L.J. 333, 345-46 (1999); Emma Phillips, The War on Civil Law? The Common 
Law as a Proxy for the Global Ambition of Law and Economics, 24 WIS. INT'L 
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to precedent includes the theory of stare decisis, that decisions of 
courts in a proper position in the hierarchy of judicial authority of the 
appropriate jurisdiction shall issue opinions that are binding on lower 
courts within the same hierarchy, but it is no longer a safe proposition 
to suggest that a civilian judge will not find precedent to be binding 
and will not follow the guidance of prior judicial determinations in the 
adjudication of a new dispute.
9
 Similarly, a common law judge may go 
to extreme lengths to distinguish precedents, and precedents of the 
same court or same level of court will be rejected from time to time—
reversed, abrogated, modified, or replaced—in the name of progress 
and justice. 
 
The purpose of this article is not to trace the exact points of 
convergence and comparative divergence in the use of and reliance on 
precedent. Rather, I use this convergence as a platform for the 
discussion of explanatory synthesis and rule synthesis. Explanatory 
synthesis, the inductive use of precedent in a demonstrative and 
persuasive presentation of how the law should be interpreted and 
applied, may be distinguished from rule synthesis because it does not 
depend on the precedent being binding or on the application of any 
form of the doctrine of stare decisis. Explanatory synthesis as a form of 
legal analysis relies on the open, scientific, inductive structure of the 
analysis and the use of multiple precedents for the accuracy and 
reliability of its predictions and conclusions. Rhetorically, explanatory 
synthesis relies on the structure of mathematical-scientific induction 
within a familiar deductive syllogistic structure, and on the open, 
demonstrative, and falsifiable analysis of multiple authorities both to 
create knowledge and understanding and for persuasive advocacy.  
                                                                   
L.J. 915, 921-22 (2007).  See generally ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN & 
JAMES RUSSELL GORDEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW (2d ed. 1977); RAYMOND YOUNGS, ENGLISH, 
FRENCH AND GERMAN COMPARATIVE LAW (1998). 
9 See generally JOHN H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 43-44, 
48-49 (1969) [MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION]; F.H. LAWSON, A 
COMMON LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAW 76, 83 (1955); Amy Coney Barrett, 
Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011 (2003); Charles H. 
Koch, Jr., Envisioning a Global Legal Culture, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 50-56 
(2003).  A consistent line of precedent certainly is more likely to be cited and 
followed and followed by a civilian court under the civil law theory of 
jurisprudence constante.  See John Bell, Comparing Precedent, 82 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1243, 1257 (1997) (book review); Dennis, supra n. 8, 54 LA. L. REV. at 
15; Francesco G. Mazzotta, Precedents in Italian Law, 9 MICH. ST. U.-DET. 
COL. L. J. INT'L L. 121, 142 (2000) (discussing ―giurisprudenza costante‖ in 
Italian law). 
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Part II of this article will introduce the concepts of explanatory 
synthesis as distinguished from rule synthesis, while parts V and VI 
will explore the advantages of explanatory synthesis both analytically 
and rhetorically as a method of demonstrating the proper 
interpretation and application of precedents in civilian and common 
law systems.  My discussion here is qualified by two topics that bear on 
the two uses of synthesis: one, the extent to which civil law and 
common law systems use and rely on precedent cases as a determiner 
and source of law, and two, the differing roles of precedent accepted 
within the legal structure, legal culture, judicial culture, and 
constitutional and statutory regime of a jurisdiction. No discussion of 
synthesis will be meaningful without at least noting these important 
background considerations that ultimately define and sometimes 
constrain my recommendations as to the use of explanatory synthesis 
and rule synthesis. Therefore, part III will discuss the first set of 
factors bearing on the two forms of synthesis, namely, four different 
uses and one non-use of precedent in civil law and common law 
systems, and part IV will discuss the second set of factors, involving 
the ability to synthesize precedents under a hierarchy of judicial 
authority in the jurisdiction, within the legal culture and the judicial 
culture of the jurisdiction, and under constitutional and statutory 
limitations of the jurisdiction. Part V will then discuss the use of 
explanatory synthesis in legal analysis and advocacy, and part VI will 
conclude with a discussion of the contemporary rhetorical implications 
of explanatory synthesis and rule synthesis. 
 
II.  Rule Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis 
 
A. Rule Synthesis 
 
As introduced above, rule synthesis is an inductive synthesis of 
authorities found to be on point and controlling of a legal question in 
order to accurately determine and state the prevailing rule of law that 
governs a legal issue.10 Authorities must be reconciled for their explicit 
                         
10  See sources cited in note 2 supra. This process of synthesis of 
authorities that form the rule on an issue is described as fundamental, a 
necessity, in modern legal method in America. See Curran, Re-Membering 
Law, supra n. 4, 34 Hofstra L. Rev. at 104; Jane Kent Gionfriddo, Thinking 
Like a Lawyer: The Heuristics of Case Synthesis, 40 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 4 
(2007); Sarah Valentine, Legal Research as a Fundamental Skill: A Lifeboat 
for Students and Law Schools, 39 U. BALT. L. REV. 173, 210 (2010) (citing ABA 
Sec. Leg. Educ. & Admis. to B., Legal Education and Professional 
Development — An Educational Continuum: Narrowing the Gap 152 (ABA 
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statements and pronouncements of the governing legal standards as 
well as examined for implicit requirements that are induced from the 
controlling authorities. Legal analysis employs synthesis of the rules to 
make a single coherent statement of the applicable legal principles 
that govern the legal issue at hand, and this becomes the ―R‖ (Rule) 
section of the discourse, or the first half of the major premise of the 
legal reasoning syllogism.11 Rule synthesis is used to formulate the 
governing legal standards on an issue of law, both the definitional 
rules12 and interpretive rules
13
 from the authorities. 
                                                                   
1992)).   
11  On syllogistic structure, see MURRAY & DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING 
AND ANALYSIS, at chs. 2, 5, 6; Murray, Rule Synthesis and Explanatory 
Synthesis, 8 LEG. COM. & RHET. at 219-20.  On the ―R‖ section of typical 
structural paradigms—TREAT, IRAC, IREAC—see LINDA H. EDWARDS, 
LEGAL WRITING: PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND ORGANIZATION, chs. 10, 11, 19, 20 
(5th ed. 2010) (discussing IREAC and variations for objective and persuasive 
discourse); MURRAY & DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS, chs. 2, 6, 7 
(discussing IRAC and TREAT); James M. Boland, Legal Writing Programs 
and Professionalism: Legal Writing Professors Can Join the Academic Club, 
18 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 711, 719-23 (2006) (discussing IRAC and IREAC); 
Kristen K. Robbins, Paradigm Lost: Recapturing Classical Rhetoric to 
Validate Legal Reasoning, 27 VT. L. REV. 483, 484-87, 492 (2003) (discussing 
IRAC and IREAC).  The second half of the major premise of the syllogism is 
defined through explanatory synthesis, as discussed infra in text 
accompanying notes 23, 46-47. 
12  A definitional rule defines a legal rule or legal standard providing the 
terms, elements, or requirements of the rule or standard. MURRAY & 
DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS, at chs. 4, 5. For example, in 
United States copyright law, the rule defining parody as a form of comment 
and criticism under 18 U.S.C. § 107 (2011) is a definitional rule, see Campbell 
v. Acuff Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994), as is the definition of ―parody‖ 
as the use of some elements of a prior author's work to create a new one that, 
at least in part, comments on or criticizes the original author's work. Id. at 
580. 
13  An interpretive rule is a rule issued by a court or provided in another 
primary legal authority (constitution, statute, or administrative rule or 
regulation) that instructs attorneys and judges on the proper interpretation 
and application of a definitional rule. MURRAY & DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING 
AND ANALYSIS, at chs. 4, 5. For example, the rules that the United States 
copyright fair use factors of 17 U.S.C. § 107 are to be weighed together in a 
case-by-case analysis in light of the purposes of copyright law where no one 
factor predominates over the other factors, and commercial usage is simply 
one factor to be weighed with the others and is not a dispositive factor, all are 
interpretive rules created by the United States Supreme Court that instruct 
the lower courts and the copyright bar as to how the copyright fair use factors 
are to be interpreted and applied. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78, 584-85. 
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Rule synthesis has been described as vital to the common law system,
14
 
and in fact, the doctrine of rule synthesis or rule proof is premised on 
the theory that case law and administrative law can and do alter the 
contents and requirements of the law, thus making it necessary to 
consider and synthesize multiple sources that apply to the issue. 
 
Rule synthesis differs from explanatory synthesis in two key ways: 
first, rule synthesis seeks to define the law. It is a method of synthesis 
of multiple sources of the law that seeks to state the actual rule and 
legal standards that govern the issue at hand. Rule synthesis analyzes 
the legal authorities in order to formulate the law that addresses the 
legal question. Second, rule synthesis requires the use of applicable 
controlling authorities that have the power to define the rule and legal 
standards governing the issue. The authorities can be constitutional, 
statutory, regulatory, administrative, or case law, but they must be 
binding, mandatory authority as to the tribunal, the parties, and the 




B. Explanatory Synthesis 
 
Explanatory synthesis, as distinguished from rule synthesis, is a 
separate process of induction of principles of interpretation and 
application concerning the rules governing a legal issue. The induction 
is from samples—namely case law—representing specific situations 
with concrete facts and in which the legal rules have been applied to 
produce a concrete outcome. While rule synthesis is the component of 
legal analysis that determines what legal standards apply to and 
control a legal issue, explanatory synthesis seeks to demonstrate and 
communicate how these legal standards work in various situations 
                         
14 Curran, Re-Membering Law, supra n. 4, 34 Hofstra L. Rev. at 104; 
Gionfriddo, supra n. 11, 40 TEX. TECH L. REV. at 4 ; Valentine, supra n. 11, 39 
U. BALT. L. REV. at 210; ABA Sec. Leg. Educ. & Admis. to Bar, Legal 
Education and Professional Development — An Educational Continuum: 
Narrowing the Gap 152 (ABA 1992). 
15 Even absent case law, rule synthesis is used to combine and reconcile 
different legal authorities on an issue. Constitutional law may affect 
statutory law or administrative and regulatory law, and even within a 
category, an issue may implicate several statutory code provisions which 
must be coherently reconciled through rule synthesis. An example in United 
States copyright law is the need to synthesize references to Title 17, U.S. 
Code, sections 101, 106, 106A, and 107 in order to determine fair use or 
infringement of copyrighted works, and to determine if a work is protected by 
the American Visual Artists Rights Act. 
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relevant to the legal issue at hand.
16
   
 
Explanatory synthesis does not seek to define the law nor does it 
require exclusively controlling authorities for its analysis. Explanatory 
synthesis seeks to demonstrate how the law has worked in prior 
situations in order to provide guidance to the tribunal in the current 
situation. Explanatory synthesis uses cases as examples—samples—of 
the disposition of legal issues in specific, concrete situations rather 
than using them as dispositive authority on the rules governing the 
issue.  The analysis and predictions formed in explanatory synthesis 
may be stronger and more persuasive if the cases used in the synthesis 
are themselves binding authority with respect to certain legal issues 
before the tribunal, but it is equally important to use adequate 
numbers of relevant, analogous cases in the synthesis. The analytical 
and rhetorical value of the synthesis to guide and persuade the 
disposition of the present case is based largely on the fact that that 





III.  Five Uses of Legal Precedents in Common Law and Civilian 
Systems 
 
I offer this discussion of five uses
18
 of legal precedents in civil law and 
common law systems merely as a backdrop for the discussion of rule 
synthesis and explanatory synthesis. The five uses of precedent are: 
 
 Use of precedent cases as binding, mandatory authority 
 Use of precedent cases as a source of law 
                         
16  See MURRAY & DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS, at chs. 6, 7 
(discussing explanatory synthesis); Murray, Rule Synthesis and Explanatory 
Synthesis, 8 LEG. COM. & RHET. at 226-30 (same). 
17 The numeric advantage of explanatory synthesis (see section V infra) 
is combined with the scientific and mathematical structure of the analysis 
that presents its reasoning in an open, demonstrative format for examination 
and potential refutation of the components of the analysis. It is this openness 
and potential for examination and rebuttal that produces the persuasive 
element of falsifiability in explanatory synthesis. When a synthesis is not 
rebutted by an opponent or other participant in the case, it stands as highly 
reliable and persuasive.  See Michael D. Murray, Law & Economics as a 
Rhetorical Perspective in Law, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1830573 
(forthcoming) (manuscript on file with the author) [Murray, Law & Economics 
as a Rhetorical Perspective in Law]. 
18  As will be seen here, this actually is a list of four uses and one ―non-
use.‖ 
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 Use of precedent cases as a source of reasoning 
 Use of precedent cases as a source of narrative reasoning 
 Use of precedent cases as non-authority 
 
Each of these uses impacts the use of rule synthesis, but explanatory 
synthesis is less affected by these differences in weight and authority 
given to precedent cases. The five uses differ in their requirements as 
to the acceptance of precedent as binding authority or an actual source 
of the law, which in turn requires an assessment of whether both rule 
synthesis (to determine the applicable rules and legal standards by 
synthesis and induction from precedents) applies in the situation, or 
only explanatory synthesis (to determine how the applicable rules and 
legal standards properly are to be interpreted and applied by induction 
from precedents). 
 
 A. Precedent cases as binding, mandatory authority 
 
In systems that accept some form of the stare decisis doctrine, 
precedent cases may be binding, mandatory authority in the 
adjudication of legal disputes. The form of stare decisis need not be the 
strongest, most rigid form that provides that precedents, if relevant 
and applicable to the issue, must be followed without deviation by the 
issuing court, courts on the same level of the hierarchy of judicial 
authority as the issuing court, or courts on any lower level of the 
applicable hierarchy of judicial authority. This is by no means the most 
common embodiment of the stare decisis doctrine even in common law 
settings; even the United States Supreme Court
19
 and the Appellate 
Panel of the British House of Lords
20
 have accepted a version of stare 
                         
19  See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., 551 U.S. 
587, 615 (2007);  
Federal Election Com'n v. Wisconsin Right To Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 500-01 
(2007); 
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 
530, 543 (1962); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119, 121 (1940). Relevant 
instances of the Court's approach to stare decisis are West Virginia Bd. of Ed. 
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943), overturning Minersville School Dist. v. 
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), and Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 
(1938), overturning Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842). 
20 Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent), [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234 (H.L), 
110 SOLICITOR'S JOURNAL 584 (1966), overturning the more rigid position 
that the House of Lords was bound by its own decisions, established in 
London Tramways v. London City Council, [1898] A.C. 375, 380.  See also 
Rupert Cross & J.W. Harris, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 102-08, 135-43 (4th 
ed. 1991); W. Barton Leach, Revisionism in the House of Lords: The Bastion 
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decisis where precedents may be changed or abrogated when 
conditions warrant a change in the law. 
 
In a system of law where precedent cases may be binding authority, 
the use of rule synthesis to prove the contents of legal rules and define 
legal standards is not simply an option for legal analysis, it should be 
required. A progression of cases that, together with statutory and 
regulatory law, define the legal standards that answer a legal issue 
should be presented in writing by virtue of a synthesis of the 
authorities, namely the code provisions, regulations, and precedent 
cases that define the legal rule. In the same system, explanatory 
synthesis is particularly effective and persuasive when precedents that 
define the rules also may be used as examples of situations where the 
rules were applied to produce a concrete outcome based on a concrete 
set of facts of the dispute. Explanatory synthesis draws from these 
controlling precedents and other, non-controlling precedents, the 
principles of how the rules are meant to operate.   
 
 B. Precedent cases as a source of law 
 
If the system and tribunal accepts the possibility that cases are useful 
as a source of law, then citation and reliance on cases as persuasive 
authority for definitional rules and interpretive rules is possible. 
Precedents will be relied on and may in fact be determinative unless 
they are distinguished or overcome with equally weighty reasoning 
based on other legal authority, but the use of precedents does not have 
to be mandatory and binding and stare decisis need not apply. The 
opportunity to use precedents persuasively and rhetorically to prove 
the existence of a definitional rule or an interpretive rule means that 
rule synthesis is possible because legal standards may be formulated 
from a group of cases, and explanatory synthesis is possible because 
principles concerning the proper interpretation and application of the 
law also may be induced from multiple cases. 
 
 C. Precedent cases as a source of reasoning 
 
In various systems, precedents are cited and relied on not for 
determination of the law and applicable legal standards, but as a legal 
source on the reasoning and policy behind a judicial decision. The cases 
do not bind the court in its determination, but rather are used as 
rationale for the decision. Both civil law and common law courts cite 
precedents for the purpose of explaining, supporting, or justifying the 
                                                                   
of Rigid Stare Decisis Falls, 80 HARV. L. REV. 797 (1967). 
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reasoning of judicial opinions without necessarily conforming to or 
relying on the precedents as mandatory authority.21 
 
In these circumstances, rule synthesis may not be employed because 
the authorities in question are not being accepted and relied on to 
prove the rule and define the legal standards that govern the issue. 
Instead, explanatory synthesis may be used to draw from cases as 
examples—samples—of situations where the law has been applied to 
produce concrete outcomes and to synthesize these samples based on 
the common principles of law and policy that unite the different 
samples. This form of demonstrative, inductive reasoning does not 
depend on the case samples being controlling any more than a single 
sample in a biological experiment is controlling of the operation of the 
experiment and the demonstration of what the experiment proves. The 
principles induced in the scientific, inductive process do not have the 
conclusive effect of binding, mandatory authority from a higher court, 
but they are persuasive and reliable because they use an open, 
demonstrative, falsifiable method to present the principles of how the 
law should be interpreted and applied in a given situation based on the 
induction of these principles from multiple situations in the past.
22
 
                         
21
  MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION at 47; Dana T. Blackmore, 
Eradicating the Long Standing Existence of a No-Precedent Rule in 
International Trade Law — Looking Toward Stare Decisis in WTO Dispute 
Settlement, 29 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 487, 497-99 (2004);  Jean 
Carbonnier, Authorities in Civil Law: France, in JOSEPH DAINOW, THE ROLE 
OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND DOCTRINE IN CIVIL LAW AND IN MIXED 
JURISDICTIONS 91, 97 (1974); Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common 
Law, Enlightened Civil Law: Legal Uniformity and the Homogenization of the 
European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63, 72-74 (2001); Giuseppe di Federico 
and Carlo Guarnieri, The Courts in Italy, in JEROLD WALTMAN & KENNETH 
HOLLAND, THE POLITICAL ROLE OF LAW COURTS IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES 
175 (1988); Lundmark, supra n. 4, 46 AM J. COMP. L. at 214-15.  See also 
Maurice Adams, The Rhetoric of Precedent and Comparative Legal Research, 
62 MOD. L. REV. 464 (1999). 
22  Explanatory synthesis informs the major premise of the deductive, 
syllogistic structure of the discourse through induction of principles 
concerning how the rules should be interpreted and applied.  The process of 
induction finds a general proposition to be true because of its relationship to 
a number of other specific propositions that are known to be true.  A certain 
genus of situations with identifiable characteristics can be defined from a 
synthesis of known situations (―species‖ of situations, or ―precedents‖) that all 
share these characteristics.  See Christof Rapp, Aristotle's Rhetoric §§ 5(C), 
7.4, in Edward N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 
2002 ed.), available at <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2002/entries/ 
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 D. Precedent cases as a source of narrative reasoning 
 
The analogical and rhetorical use of precedent cases as a source of 
narrative forms and ―stories‖ in the law is well recognized in American 
legal method.
23
 Precedent cases contain a story, and multiple 
precedents can contain the same storyline or directly related and 
analogous storylines. In American legal method, an attorney often 
relates her client‘s situation to one or more of the precedent storylines 
if the outcome of the stories in the precedents is favorable to the client; 
                                                                   
aristotle-rhetoric/> (accessed Feb. 7, 2008) (last substantive edit May 2, 2002). 
The mathematical and scientific forms match the structure for legal discourse 
and rhetoric derived from the classical tradition, in which there are two 
permitted logical structures for an argument, the deductive and the inductive.  
ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, Book I, ch. 1 at 1355a (W. Rhys Roberts transl. 
1965); MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE INVENTIONE 93, 104 (H.M. Hubbell 
transl., 1949); 1 MARIUS FABIUS QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTIO ORATORIA 273 (H.E. 
Butler transl., 1954).  The forms for effective legal discourse, as opposed to 
mathematical, scientific proof, were the deductive, syllogistic rhetorical form 
known as an enthymeme, and the inductive rhetorical form known as an 
example or paradigm argument.  ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra, at Book I, 
ch. 2 at 1356b.  See also GEORGE A. KENNEDY, ARISTOTLE ON RHETORIC: A 
THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 40 & n. 49 (1991).  Aristotle believed the 
enthymeme to be the superior of the two forms.  ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, 
supra, at Book I, ch. 1 at 1355a, Book I, ch. 2 at 1356b.  Legal method in the 
United States nearly uniformly promotes the use of a deductive syllogistic (or 
enthymatic) form for the presentation of legal analysis in writing.  A logical, 
demonstrative presentation lends credibility and persuasiveness to the 
discourse and reasoning. In rhetorical terms, the use of a deductive syllogistic 
structure such as IRAC, IREAC, TREAT, and others, is a firmly established 
expectation if not a requirement of discourse within the legal writing 
discourse community.  See generally Susan L. DeJarnatt, Law Talk: 
Speaking, Writing, and Entering the Discourse of Law, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 489 
(2002); Jill J. Ramsfield, Is ―Logic‖ Culturally Based? A Contrastive, 
International Approach to the U.S. Law Classroom, 47 J. LEG. EDUC. 157, 
164-77 (1997). 
23 See, e.g., Linda L. Berger, How Embedded Knowledge Structures 
Affect Judicial Decision Making: A Rhetorical Analysis of Metaphor, 
Narrative, and Imagination in Child Custody Disputes, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. 
L.J. 259, 266-69, 307 (2009); Douglas M. Coulson, Legal Writing and 
Disciplinary Knowledge-Building: A Comparative Study, 6 J. ASS'N L. 
WRITING DIRS. 160, 167-68, 195-97 (2009); Brian J. Foley & Ruth Anne 
Robbins, Fiction 101: A Primer for Lawyers on How to Use Fiction Writing 
Techniques to Write Persuasive Facts Sections, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 459 (2001); 
Murray, Rule Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis, 8 LEG. COM. & RHET. at 
220-21. 
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by the same token, an attorney will attempt to tell a new story of the 
client to distinguish one or more precedent cases whose stories do not 
support a favorable disposition of the client‘s case. 
 
One method employed in narrative reasoning using precedent cases is 
case-to-case analogical reasoning. This one-to-one comparison of the 
client's story to the storyline of a single precedent follows a familiar 
methodology of narrative reasoning: if the story of the client is the 
same as the story of the precedent, the ending of the story (the outcome 
and disposition) should also be the same in both cases. Mythical, 
archetypical story forms serve a similar cognitive, information 
processing and comprehension role: the attorney story-teller suggests 
that a mythical, archetypical form is represented in the client's case as 
a way of causing the audience—the tribunal or the finder of fact (i.e., 




Rule synthesis is not designed to exploit the narrative values of 
precedents because the focus of rule synthesis is the legal rules in the 
cases and how they have been altered or amended through the 
workings of the precedent. Rule synthesis seeks to induce legal rules—
definitional rules and interpretive rules—from the precedents. Its 
focus is not on the facts of the case and lessons learned from the 
                         
24 This discussion merely scratches the surface of the theory and practice 
of the story-telling movement and narrative reasoning discipline in legal 
analysis, but for further reading, I offer the following sources:  ANTHONY G. 
AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 113-14 (2000); DAVID RAY 
PAPKE, NARRATIVE AND THE LEGAL DISCOURSE: A READER IN STORYTELLING 
AND THE LAW (1991); Jane B. Baron & Julia Epstein, Is Law Narrative?, 45 
BUFF. L. REV. 141 (1997); Berger, supra n. 24, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 259; 
Jerome Bruner, Life as Narrative, 71 SOC. RES. 691, 692 (2004); Linda H. 
Edwards, The Convergence of Analogical and Dialectic Imaginations in Legal 
Discourse, 20 LEGAL STUD. F. 7 (1996); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, 
Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 
807 (1993); Foley & Robbins, supra n. 24, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 459;  J. 
Christopher Rideout, So What's in a Name: A Rhetorical Reading of 
Washington's Sexually Violent Predator's Act, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 
781 (1992); Ruth Anne Robbins, An Introduction to Applied Storytelling and 
to this Symposium, 14 L. WRITING: J. L. WRITING INST. 3 (2008); Ruth Anne 
Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers and Merlin: Telling the Client's Story 
Using the Characters and Paradigm of the Archetypal Hero's Journey, 29 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 767 (2006); Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative 
Construction of Legal Reality, 18 VT. L. REV. 681, 717 (1994); James Boyd 
White, Reading Law and Reading Literature: Law as Language, in JAMES 
BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE 
LAW 77 (1985). 
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application of the legal rules in various factual scenarios. 
 
On the other hand, explanatory synthesis is perfectly adapted to the 
use of facts and storylines from precedent cases in the induction of 
principles of how the law properly is to be applied to produce certain, 
predictable dispositions in certain, concrete factual scenarios or story-
settings. The use of facts and storylines within the context of a legal 
setting is the exact focus of explanatory synthesis.
25
   
 
It is less apparent that judges and lawyers in civil law systems 
participate in this form of reasoning and legal discourse. Certainly, 
analogical reasoning is used whenever current cases are compared to 
earlier precedent cases, but the exact use of the storyline or narrative 
elements of earlier precedents may be less common. One obvious 
reason lies in the judicial culture and practices of case reporting in civil 
law systems that downplays, simplifies, or eliminates the discussion of 
facts in case reports. It is difficult, or at times impossible, to piece 
together a synthesis of the common storylines of a group of applicable 
precedent cases if the reports of the cases neglect to mention the facts 




 E. Precedent cases as non-authority 
 
If by law or by established rules and regulations, cases may not be 
cited and relied on in judicial decisions, then precedent cases are non-
authority. This is the only situation when rule synthesis and 
explanatory synthesis may not be employed because there is no 
authority to cite cases let alone synthesize them, and any attempt to 
produce a synthesis in legal writing would be a violation of the rules 
and potentially would constitute malpractice. 
 
IV. Factors Affecting Syntheses of Precedents 
 
The divergence in the usage of precedent does not disqualify the use of 
synthesis for the demonstration and explanation of how the law 
operates in specific, relevant situations in four out of the five uses 
discussed in the section above. Both civilian and common law judges 
use precedent in the four ways described above—judges in both 
systems cite precedent in their opinions, and attorneys in both systems 
cite precedent in their briefs. But the extent to which rule synthesis or 
explanatory synthesis may or should be employed by attorneys in their 
                         
25 See examples in section V, infra. 
26 See discussion in section IV(C), infra. 
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brief-writing further depends on four factors particular to the 
jurisdiction, and not necessarily dependent on a label of common law 
vs. civilian regarding the jurisdiction. These factors are: 
 
 A hierarchy of judicial authority in the jurisdiction 
 Legal culture and its accepted uses of precedent within the 
jurisdiction‘s legal writing discourse community 
 Judicial culture and its approach to decision-writing and case-
reporting 
 Constitutional or statutory provisions and restrictions 
 
The full exploration of these factors is beyond the scope of this article, 
but I will briefly note how several of these factors would limit the use 
of rule synthesis of precedent cases to prove the contents of a legal rule 
and define a legal standard; these factors also partially limit the scope 
of the analysis of authorities and the predictions and recommendations 
made through explanatory synthesis, but do not eliminate the 
opportunity for the use of explanatory synthesis altogether. 
 
A. Hierarchy of judicial authority 
 
Common law practitioners might take it for granted that a court 
system will be arranged in a hierarchical manner and that courts 
higher up on the scale will have the power of judicial review over any 
courts lower down in the hierarchy. This is not to be taken for granted 
in civilian systems; it must be determined whether there are levels of 





                         
27  For example, Italy‘s court system is designed in such a way that 
courts are not directly reviewed by the Cour de Cassassione (Court of 
Cassation) on the basis of its placement on a certain tier of a hierarchy.  The 
high court is separate from the hierarchies of other courts, and it reviews the 
law—i.e., legal issues, questions of law—only. Other courts may take into 
account Court of Cassation cases as highly persuasive authority, particularly 
a line of opinions accepted as giurisprudenza costante, but the lack of a 
hierarchical structure of review has a direct bearing on whether a trial or 
intermediate level court should consider an opinion of the Court of Cassation 
to be a controlling authority.  See Antonio Baldassarre, Structure and 
Organization of the Constitutional Court of Italy, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 649 
(1996); Mazzotta, supra n. 10, 9 MICH. ST. U.-DET. COL. L. J. INT'L L. at 134; 
William J. Nardini, Passive Activism and the Limits of Judicial Self-Restraint: 
Lessons for America from the Italian Constitutional Court, 30 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1, 6-9 (1999). 
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Rule synthesis requires binding authority that has the potential to 
shape the law, but the method of explanatory synthesis, which does not 
seek to define the law but to explain and advocate how the law 
properly is to be interpreted and applied, fits more of the uses because 
it does not require precedent to be binding, nor does it require 
precedent to be accepted as a source of law. It also is not directly 
dependent on a hierarchy of judicial authority. Cases are used for their 
relevance to the dispute and their storyline, not purely for their power 
as mandatory authority. Indeed, the absence of a hierarchy may free 
counsel to make more aggressive and complex syntheses of authorities 
unhampered by the particular level of court that issued the opinion.
28
 
At the very least, the absence of an established hierarchy of judicial 
authority opens up cases from more levels of courts for analysis using 
explanatory synthesis. 
 
I do not want to overstate this point: I repeat that even when using 
explanatory synthesis, drawing from cases from the highest, 
controlling courts is the superior practice when those cases exist and 
are on point on the issue.  An attorney cannot ignore the established 
hierarchy of judicial authority, if one exists, and simply pick favorable 
cases from lower level courts to synthesize, ignoring a batch of 
unfavorable cases from higher, controlling courts.  Instead, the 





B. Legal culture and its accepted uses of precedent 
 
The four uses and one non-use of precedent discussed above represent 
the legal culture of a jurisdiction and its acceptance of, tolerance for, or 
rejection of the use of precedent cases for one or more of the possible 
uses of precedent.  This culture is more than a cautionary suggestion 
or inconvenience; it represents conventions that define whether certain 
uses of precedent can be employed by practitioners or judges, or will 
                         
28 Naturally, this strategy is highly contingent on the acceptance of 
citation of trial level or lower level courts in any capacity within the legal 
community and its culture, as discussed in the section below. 
29 If the authorities largely are unfavorable, then the attorney might 
attempt to argue for a change in the law drawing from cases, statutory and 
code provisions, and from secondary authorities the points of public policy 
that support the change in the requirements or in the interpretation of the 
law.  This, too, is accomplished through explanatory synthesis.  If there is no 
support for the change in the cases, code, or opinio juris of the jurisdiction, 
then the attorney should rethink the client's situation and her strategy in 
representing the client. 
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the use cost the author credibility and persuasion for ignoring or 
bucking the convention.  In rhetorical terms, the acceptance, toleration, 
or rejection of precedent becomes an expectation of the legal writing 
discourse community, and therefore, it goes to the heart of the author's 
ability to communicate to build knowledge and understanding, let 
alone persuade the audience through the discourse.  No description of 
synthesis, no matter how rosy, will overcome the demands and 
requirements of the legal writing discourse community if the 
community does not accept or tolerate the use of precedent cases 
employed in the synthesis. 
 
C. Judicial Culture and Case Reporting 
 
Judicial culture and case reporting as noted here refers to how judges 
draft and report their opinions in cases.  The ability to synthesize cases 
depends in part on the judge or the reporter of cases providing enough 
information to allow practitioners to make connections between cases 
or to draw from the facts, storyline, or public policies within cases. 
 
As one brief example, if the courts reporting four copyright fair use 
cases from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit—
Salinger v. Colting,
30
 Blanch v. Koons,
31
 Castle Rock Entertainment v. 
Carol Publishing Group,
32
 and Liebovitz v. Paramount Pictures
33
—had 
not included the specific facts of each case and a detailed description of 
how those facts interacted with the public policies of copyright law in 
general and copyright fair use law in particular, practitioners would 
not be able to tell the difference between a use that is held to exploit 
the original material copied for the same purposes and toward the 
same ends as the original work
34
 as compared to cases where the 
second work changed the character, nature, and purpose of the original 
material in such a way that the original work was not exploited in any 
manner contrary to the public policy of copyright law that promotes 
the creation of original works.
35
 Because the courts did include this 
information, we are able to form the following explanatory synthesis to 
explain the operation of the fair use provision in the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals: 
A use that exploits the original material copied for 
                         
30 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010). 
31 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006). 
32 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998). 
33 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998). 
34 See Salinger, 607 F.3d 68; Castle Rock, 150 F.3d 132. 
35 See Blanch, 467 F.3d 244; Liebovitz, 137 F.3d 109. 
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the same purposes and toward the same ends as 
the original work will not be a fair use of the 
original work, but a second work will be a fair use 
if it changes the character, nature, and purpose of 
the original material in such a way that the 
original work is not exploited in any manner that 
is contrary to the public policy of copyright law 
that promotes the creation of original works.  
Compare Salinger, 607 F.3d 68 (60 Years Later-
Coming Through the Rye held to exploit the same 
themes, same story arc, same characters, and same 
situations as the original work, Catcher in the Rye, 
and was held not to be fair), and Castle Rock, 150 
F.3d 132 (Seinfeld trivia book held to exploit the 
original material from the Seinfeld television show 
for the same purposes—comedy and 
entertainment—for which the original material 
was created, and was held not to be fair), with 
Blanch, 467 F.3d 244 (Jeffrey Koons' work, Niagra, 
transformed the content, context, and meaning of 
Blanch's original fashion photograph in a manner 
that completely changed the theme and purpose of 
the work from one of fashion and allure to one that 
critically commented on our society's hungers and 
appetites, and was held to be fair), and Liebovitz, 
137 F.3d 109 (Naked Gun movie ad changed the 
content, context, and meaning of the original 
photograph from one of serious, artistic 
photography celebrating classical beauty to one of 
a spoof of beauty when the original female star's 
head was replaced on her body by the head of a 
famous male comedian, and was held to be fair). 
 
Common law system judges and practitioners might assume that all 
courts in all systems give detailed descriptions of the background and 
operative facts of each case that is adjudicated, along with a careful 
accounting of the procedural history of the case and an explanation of 
the rationale for the court's decision supported by citations to 
authorities. In fact, this description only applies in a general manner 
to courts in common law systems. Civil law courts vary in the extent to 
which facts, explanation or justification of the court's rationale, or 
citation to authorities are routinely used or ever used in reports of 
decisions. As one example, Italy routinely reports the decisions of the 
high court—the Cour de Cassassione (Court of Cassation)—in the form 
of a massima (pl., massime), an abstract of the legal rule applied in the 
case, devoid of any description of the facts or how the law applied to 
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the facts to produce the outcome in the case.
36
 This practice allows rule 
synthesis if the legal rule or rules from the case are reported or at least 
abstracted, but it leaves no opportunity for the use of precedent cases 
as a source of rationale and legal reasoning, nor does it preserve the 
opportunity to use cases as a source of the storyline and legal narrative.  
Thus, the limits imposed by the judicial culture and case reporting 
practices of the jurisdiction are real and potentially significant for any 
use of rule synthesis and explanatory synthesis in legal practice. 
 
D. Constitutional or Statutory Provisions Affecting the Use 
of Precedent 
 
The last factor to note in the analysis of whether rule synthesis or 
explanatory synthesis is viable within the jurisdiction is the extent to 
which civil code or constitutional provisions affect the potential uses of 
precedent. The law may restrict the citation of and reliance on 
precedent cases for certain purposes or in certain contexts. A simple, 
but straightforward example is a code provision that provides that 
precedent cases are not authority,
37
 indicating that precedent cases 
should not be cited or relied upon as a source of the law or binding 
legal authority in legal writing and reasoning.  On the other hand, use 
of precedent cases may be encouraged by constitutional or statutory 
provisions and the manner in which these provisions are interpreted 
and applied in the jurisdiction. In several civil law jurisdictions, the 
use of general clauses
38
 or reasoning by analogy to other related but 
not specifically applicable sections of the code in order to cover new 
issues not contemplated by the drafters of the code
39
 simulates the 
                         
36
  Curren, Re-Membering Law, supra n. 4, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. at 103; 
Mazzotta, supra n. 10, 9 MICH. ST. U.J. INT'L L. at 129-31, 150-51; John 
Henry Merryman, The Italian Style III: Interpretation, 18 STAN. L. REV. 583, 
587, 593 (1966); Michele Taruffo & Massimo La Torre, Precedent in Italy, in 
MACCORMICK & SUMMERS, INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS at 141, 148. 
37 E.g., Austrian Civil Code (Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch), 
ABGB § 12; French Civil Code, C. Civ. art. 5; N.C.P.C. art. 455 (France);  
Italian Codice Civile, C.C. Capo I; Spanish Civil Code (Codigo Civil), C.C. art. 
1(1); Swiss Zivilgesetzbuch, ZGB art. I. 
38 Regarding the use of general clauses, see Austrian Allgemeines 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, ABGB §§ 7, 914; German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, 
BGB §§ 138, para. 1, 242, 826; French Civil Code, C. Civ. arts. 1134 para. 3, 
1135, 1160; Italian Codice Civile, C.C. arts. 1374, 1375; Swiss Zivilgesetzbuch, 
ZGB art. 2 para. 2. 
39 Regarding the use of reasoning by analogy to other code provisions, 
see 1 C. AUBRY & C. RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS § 40, 130 (4th ed. 
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same process of analogical reasoning and extension of principles and 
public policy reflected in the law to new situations in new cases that is 
represented by the processes of rule synthesis and explanatory 
synthesis.
40
 Practitioners must be alert for the opportunity to 
synthesize code provisions in an analogical use of rule synthesis as 
well as to combine interpretive rules with public policy sources through 
explanatory synthesis. 
  
V. Use of Explanatory Synthesis for Legal Analysis 
 
Explanatory synthesis contemplates that what judges say does not 
always match what they do.
41
 Courts might describe a rule or legal 
standard (tell what the rule is), but it remains for subsequent cases to 
illustrate the legal standard in actual legal situations (show what the 
rule means). If a copyright court says, ―a transformative work [in 
copyright fair use law] is one that 'adds something new, with a further 
purpose or different character, altering the first [work] with new 
expression, meaning or message,'‖
42
 that pronouncement gives little 
guidance as to what changes or additions to works actually add 
something new, changing the purpose or character of the original work, 
and altering the original work with sufficiently new expression, 
meaning, or message. Cases provide the answer. Cases are concrete 
                                                                   
1869); Baudenbacher, supra n. 9, 34 TEX. INT'L L.J. at 338; S. Herman, The 
Equity of the Statute and Ratio Scripta: Legislative Interpretation Among 
Legislative Agnostics and True Believers, 69 TUL. L. REV. 535 (1994);  
Herman & Hoskins, Perspectives on Code Structure: Historical Experience, 
Modern Formats, and Policy Considerations, 54 TUL. L. REV. 987, 1022-41 
(1980); 1 Motive zu dem Entwurfe eines Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches für das 
Deutsche Reich 16 (1888); Konrad Zweigert & H.J. Puttfarken, Statutory 
Interpretation—Civilian Style, 44 TUL. L. REV. 704 (1970). 
40 Rule synthesis and explanatory synthesis are flexible in the choice of 
sources to synthesize.  Statutory and code provisions, secondary authorities, 
and sources of opinio juris all can be synthesized by using an inductive 
method to draw rules or interpretive principles from multiple authorities. 
41 This is not a recent observation. See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE 
BRAMBLE BUSH 14 (Oceana Pub. 1960) (orig. ed. 1930). See also BENJAMIN N. 
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 19–25, 51–63 (Yale U. 
Press 1949) (orig. ed. 1921) (evaluation of precedents in a process of 
induction); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 8, 9, 
11–12 (Greenwood 1970) (orig. ed., Colum. U. Press 1928) (induction and 
―relativity‖ concerning precedents); EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
LEGAL REASONING 2–3, 5, 8, 26, 29–30 (U. Chi. Press 1949); Robert A. Leflar, 
Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 810, 
819 (1961). 
42 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
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examples of situations where the rules were applied to produce an 
outcome; there are winners and losers in each case. In the copyright 
example from section IV above, the winners are those who properly 
transformed original works and the losers are those who did not.
43
 
Explanatory synthesis examines the data set of cases to induce the 
illustrations of how the rules work, and synthesizes the case 
illustrations into principles that provide a guide for the proper 
interpretation and application of the law.
44
 The statement of the 
principles is persuasive because it is produced using induction in a 





Explanatory synthesis is reported in the ―E‖ section (explanation 
section) of TREAT (Thesis- Rule- Explanation- Application- Thesis 
restated) and IREAC (Issue- Rule- Explanation- Application- 
Conclusion) paradigms.
46
 The structure of explanatory syntheses is 
                         
43 The theory of explanatory synthesis and rule synthesis recognizes that 
cases are not rules; cases contain rules, they pronounce rules, they adopt 
rules and interpret rules and apply the rules to facts, but judicial opinions 
are themselves not rules. Rule synthesis reports the synthesized results of 
courts‘ adoption, interpretation, and pronouncement of legal rules. Thus, rule 
synthesis is sometimes referred to as ―rule proof.‖ Explanatory synthesis is 
different, separate from rule proof. It uses cases as a source of information on 
the application of the rules to facts, the concrete factual situations of the 
cases themselves. See Murray, Rule Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis, 8 
Leg. Com. & Rhet. at 220. 
44 See MURRAY & DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING & ANALYSIS at ch. 6. 
45 See Murray, Law & Economics as a Rhetorical Perspective in Law, 
supra n.18, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1830573 (forthcoming) (discussing the 
rhetorical advantages of open, demonstrative reasoning). 
46  Structural Paradigms such as TREAT and IREAC and IRAC are 
themselves based on a deductive reasoning syllogism or enthymeme. The 
Thesis (TREAT form) or Issue (IREAC or IRAC forms) section states the 
question to be answered in the analysis, the Rule section (of all forms) and 
Explanation section (of TREAT and IREAC forms) states the major premise 
of the deduction, and the Application section (of all forms) states the minor 
premise of the deduction, and the Thesis restated (TREAT form) or 
Conclusion (IREAC or IRAC forms) states the conclusion formulated in the 
deduction. Syllogistic-Enthymatic forms are standard for the exposition of 
legal writing in both common law and civilian systems.  See Baudenbacher, 
supra n. 9, 34 TEX. INT'L L.J. at 334, 354; D. Neil MacCormick, Le 
Raisonnement Juridique, 33 ARCH. PHIL. D. 99, 103 (1988); André Tunc, 
Methodology of the Civil Law in France, 50 TUL. L. REV. 459, 467 (1976);  
Catherine Valcke, Quebec Civil Law and Canadian Federalism, 21 YALE J. 
INT'L L. 67, 83-84 (1996); ATHANASSIOS YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW 
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designed for demonstrative inductive reasoning that presents the 
principles concerning how the rules are to be interpreted and applied 
first, followed by the authorities from which the principles are induced. 
 






Each principle is to be induced from multiple authorities, so the 
citation will appear different from a statement of the rule in the rule 
section where only one statute or at most a very small number of 
controlling authorities is the source of a definitional rule. Each 
authority in the synthesis is used as an example of a situation where 
the rule was applied to produce a concrete outcome.  Each synthesis 
has one principle supported by multiple citations to authorities, and 
each citation has a parenthetical that explains in as few words as 
possible the facts and circumstances and outcome of the case relevant 
to the application of the rule. Thus the complete structure is the 
following: 
 
Interpretive Principle—Citation 1 (details concerning the 
application of the rule in citation 1); Citation 2 (details 
concerning the application of the rule in citation 2); Citation 3 





An example from an actual authority is: 
 
Courts have been reluctant to find fair use when 
an original work is merely retransmitted in a 
                                                                   
SYSTEM, supra n. 8, at 89. 
47  Each part is necessary: the principle stated is the product of the 
induction. It reveals the interpretive principle concerning how the rules are 
to be interpreted and applied based on the case examples cited in the 
synthesis. The citations are necessary to show that the principle is supported 
by multiple authorities. And the parentheticals explain the details of facts, 
policy, holding, and outcome of the rule application that are necessary to 
explain how each case example supports the interpretive principle stated in 
the synthesis. All of the parts must be stated openly because this is 
demonstrative reasoning, open to examination and refutation, and thus 
highly persuasive if it is not rebutted. See Murray, Rule Synthesis and 
Explanatory Synthesis, 8 LEG. COMM. & RHET. at 221; MURRAY & DESANCTIS, 
LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS at ch. 6. 
48  See MURRAY & DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS at ch. 6. 
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different medium. See Infinity Broad. Corp. v. 
Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(finding that retransmission of radio broadcast 
over telephone lines is not transformative); LA 
News Service v. Reuters Television Int'l Ltd., 149 
F.3d 987, 993 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that 
reproducing news footage without editing the 
footage is not very transformative); UMG 
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 
349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that 
reproduction of audio CD into computer MP3 




The principle is a statement concerning the proper application of the 
rule induced from cases. The citations are to the authorities from 
which the principle is induced. Parentheticals are provided for each 
citation to explain and illustrate how the authority supports the 
principle. Parentheticals allow the author to give just enough 
information (facts, public policy, or other relevant details) as is 




The following examples, once again from United States copyright law 
cases,
51
 are offered to demonstrate the method: 
 
The use of an artistic original work will be 
deemed transformative when the use adds valua-
ble artistic changes to the original giving the re-
                         
49  I chose a fairly short and succinct example taken out of an actual 
legal authority to illustrate the form of the method. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft 
Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 819 & n.19 (9th Cir. 2003). As explained below, a large 
part of the effectiveness, reliability, and persuasiveness of an explanatory 
synthesis comes from the use of significant numbers of precedent cases in the 
synthesis from which the principles are induced.  Therefore, a synthesis of 
only three cases would be a minimal number not an optimal number nor a 
target number of precedent cases to use. Syntheses of five, six, or seven cases 
are more effective and persuasive than syntheses of three cases, and, 
depending on the topic of the synthesis, larger numbers certainly may be 
used to support an effective, reliable, and persuasive statement of the 
principles induced. The limitation on the number of cases for an individual 
syntheses may be more closely tied to the amount of information that must be 
stated in the parenthetical for each so that an individual synthesis does not 
run on for several pages of text. 
50  See MURRAY & DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING & ANALYSIS, supra n. 7, at 
ch. 6 (explaining the methodology and giving examples). 
51
  I have used a short form for citations to conserve space. 
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sulting work new artistic meaning and artistic 
expression.52  See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-80 
(rap group added new musical style and genre and 
new lyrics to original rock ballad creating a new 
musical composition with a new meaning); 
Blanch, 467 F.3d at 244  (artist placed original fa-
shion magazine photographic image into painting 
combining image with additional images of junk 
food and Niagra Falls to make new expression 
concerning the appetites flowing through modern 
society); Leibovitz, 137 F.3d at 109 (movie poster 
changed original photograph from a work of se-
rious art with historical Renaissance art reference 
to one of comic art with a new message of buffoo-
nery).   
 
The artistic changes must create a new meaning 
and new expression; if the original is simply 
redisplayed, reproduced, rebroadcast, or 
redistributed in a new mode or method of 
exploiting the same creative artistic virtues of the 
original work, the use will not be deemed 
transformative and not a fair use.  See Bouchat, 
619 F.3d at 301 (plaintiff ‘s Shield Drawing was 
adapted for a highly stylized Raven‘s ―Flying B‖ 
logo on helmets and uniforms, on the playing 
field, and in posters, tickets, and advertising, but 
all such uses as a logo still revealed and 
reproduced the same valuable artistic expression 
as the original Shield Drawing, and the product of 
the changes and adaptations still carried the same 
meaning and message as the original); Gaylord, 
595 F.3d at 1364 (photograph and postage stamp 
depicting plaintiff ‘s Korean War Memorial each 
adapted and altered the appearance of the war 
memorial to display a different tone and mood in 
the depiction—gray, murky, fog of war in the 
photograph, and stark, cold, loneliness of war in 
                         
52  I am citing the cases in the text of this article to draw attention to the 
mode of demonstration of explanatory synthesis which requires specific 
attention both to the principle induced from the data set and the 
parentheticals provided after each citation supporting the principle.  
Placement of the citations and parentheticals in the text is intended to 
facilitate the reading of the parentheticals.  I have also separated each 
explanatory synthesis principle and citation string with a paragraph break to 
facilitate reading. 
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winter in the stamp—but the ultimate meaning 
and message of the original memorial and the two 
artistic adaptations was held to be the same: to 
remember and celebrate Korean War Veterans; 
thus, the uses were not fair); Bridgeport v. UMG, 
585 F.3d at 267 (although defendant‘s sampling 
placed the iconic Atomic Dog funk lyric and funk 
track in an updated hip-hop recording, the funk 
track was reproduced with little variance or 
alteration from the original and was reused for 
the same musical artistic purposes as the original, 
and the hip-hop version of the sample carried the 
same meaning and expression as the original: a 
low tone beat and syncopated vocalization of the 
same word, ―dog,‖ as heard in the original; thus, 
the use was not fair); Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 132 
(changing the format and medium of 
entertainment material from the Seinfeld 
television series to a trivia quiz format did not add 
new and valuable artistic or entertainment 
content to the original material, and did not 
change the meaning, message, expression, or 
purpose of the original material; thus, the use of 
the original entertainment content was not fair).   
 
A change in context for an artistic work even 
without any changes to the content of the work 
may be sufficient if the predominant purpose and 
functioning of the new work is sufficiently 
different from the original work and fulfills a goal 
of the copyright laws.  See Bouchat, 619 F.3d at 
301 (use of original Shield Drawing in logos held 
and displayed for historical and archival reasons 
at the Baltimore Ravens‘ headquarters was a use 
with a purpose and function different from the 
artistic purpose and meaning of the original work; 
historical, referential, and archival uses are 
appropriate fair use purposes); Perfect 10 , 508 
F.3d at 1146 (original photographs were reduced 
in size to thumbnail images but otherwise 
reproduced verbatim, but the purpose and 
function of the thumbnails within a search engine 
image search results screen was a completely new 
function with a new and different purpose and 
meaning from the artistic purposes and meaning 
of the original photographs; the use fulfilled 
proper fair use reference and research purposes); 
Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 605 (original 
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images of concert posters were reduced in size but 
otherwise reproduced verbatim, but the purpose 
and function of the new use of the images—to 
document a timeline of concert performances of 
the Grateful Dead—was completely new and 
different from the artistic purposes and meaning 
of the original poster images and fulfilled proper 
fair use archival, historical, referential, and 
educational purposes); Kelly, 280 F.3d at 934 (as 
in Perfect 10, use of original images in reduced 
size for purpose of displaying search results in 
internet image search engine was new function 
with a new purpose and meaning for the images 
that fulfilled proper fair use reference and 
research purposes); Nunez, 235 F.3d at 18 
(republication of original modeling portfolio 
photographs without alteration but within new 
context of news reporting of the actual existence of 
the photographs themselves after subject became 
Puerto Rico‘s Miss Universe contestant was a new 
function with a new meaning and new purpose for 
the photographs that met fair use news and 
reference purposes); Sony Computer v. Bleem, 214 
F.3d at 1022 (use of screen shots from original 
computer game in comparative advertising to 
critique the original images was fair use).   
 
A change in context alone for artistic works is not 
necessarily sufficient if the change does not have a 
new purpose and function that communicates a 
new meaning with new, valuable expression 
furthering a goal of the copyright laws.  See 
Bouchat, 619 F.3d at 301 (aside from historical 
and archival uses at Baltimore Ravens‘ 
headquarters, the general use of the plaintiff ‘s 
Shield Drawing in stadium advertising, on the 
field, on uniforms, on tickets and other 
merchandise did not represent a new appropriate 
function for the drawing and did not fulfill a 
different artistic or creative purpose for the 
original work, and thus, did not constitute a fair 
use); Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1364 (function and 
meaning of the original sculpture and the images 
in the photograph and postage stamp were held to 
be the same: to celebrate and remember Korean 
War Veterans); Leadsinger, 512 F.3d at 522 
(change in form and function from audio recording 
to karaoke soundtrack audio recording was not a 
new function carrying new meaning or purpose 
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from original musical recordings); Zomba 
Enterprises, 491 F.3d at 574 (same); Elvis Presley 
Enterprises v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d at 622 
(video and audio segments from performances of 
Elvis were placed in new context—a 
comprehensive video biography work—but were 
reproduced for the same purpose and carried the 
same function and meaning as the original video 
and audio recordings); Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 
191 (copying two-minute segments of original 
motion pictures for use as internal reference for 
proprietary video database did not create a new 
function carrying a new appropriate fair use 
meaning and purpose different from the original 
artistic works); On Davis, 246 F.3d at 152 
(depiction of original artwork in print ad was a 
new context for the work without any change in 
artistic purpose and function of the original work); 
A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1004 
(facilitating a change in format from CD to MP3 
format and changing context of recording to 
facilitate unlicensed uncompensated file transfer 
did not create a new function carrying a new 
appropriate fair use meaning and purpose 
different from the original artistic works); Infinity 
Broadcasting, 150 F.3d at 104 (change in mode 
and medium of communication from radio 
broadcast to telephone communication did not 
create a new function carrying a new appropriate 
fair use meaning and purpose different from the 
original artistic works); Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 70 
(reproduction of story quilt image from authorized 
museum poster to unauthorized use as set 
dressing on television program did not create a 
new function carrying a new appropriate fair use 
meaning and purpose different from the original 
artistic work). 
 




Under Article 10 of the European Human Rights 
Convention, the European Court of Human Rights 
takes a broad view of interferences with speech 
that are ―prescribed by law‖ and support a ―legi-
timate aim‖ of government.  See Nur Radyo v. Te-
                         
53
  Once again, I have used an abbreviated citation form to conserve space. 
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levizyon Yayinciligi A.S. v. Turkey, App. No. 
42284/05 at ¶ 47 (Jan. 12, 2011) (Court assumed 
the interference with radio broadcasting of con-
troversial religious messages was prescribed by 
law and pursued a legitimate aim of protection of 
national solidarity, peace and prosperity of socie-
ty, and the reputation and rights of others); Poy-
raz v. Turkey, App. No. 15966/06 at ¶ 60 (Dec. 7, 
2010) (interference with speech held prescribed by 
the provisions of the Code of Obligations and the 
Civil code, supported legitimate aim of protection 
of the reputation rights of others); Gozel v. Tur-
key, App. No. 43453/04 at ¶ 43-45 (Oct. 6, 2010) 
(Court found the interference with periodical pub-
lication prescribed by two separate statutes and 
supported by a legitimate aim of fighting terror-
ism); Alinak v. Turkey, App. No. 40287/98 at ¶ 35 
(Mar. 29, 2005) (interference with book distribu-
tion prescribed by the Constitution and Code of 
Criminal Procedure and supported legitimate aim 
of preventing crime); Sener v. Turkey, 37 E.H.RR. 
34 at ¶¶ 32, 35 (2003) (interference prescribed by 
Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1991 and had a le-
gitimate aim of protecting national security); Po-
lat v. Turkey, App. No. 23500/94 at ¶¶ 36, 39 
(July 8, 1999) (interference prescribed by Pre-
vention of Terrorism Act and had a legitimate aim 
of protection of national security and territorial 
integrity).  
  
Critical and derogatory statements about the gov-
ernment are subject to wider tolerance than criti-
cal or defamatory statements about an individual, 
even a politician.  Compare Gozel (statements ac-
cusing government of being a fascist dictatorship 
did not justify interference with speech under Art. 
10), and Alinak (fictional account of real-life atroc-
ities allegedly perpetrated by the government did 
not justify interference with speech under Art. 
10), and Sener (article critical of the government‘s 
treatment of Kurds, including accusations of 
chemical warfare and genocide, did not justify in-
terference with speech under Art. 10), and Polat 
(book recounting factual details of atrocities com-
mitted by the government did not justify interfe-
rence with speech under Art. 10), and Lingens v. 
Austria, App. No. 9815/82 (July 8, 1986) (press 
publication of allegations concerning politician‘s 
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wartime improprieties did not justify interference 
with speech and press under Art. 10), with Poyraz 
(civil judgment based on vague but suggestive 
statements to the press regarding an unnamed 
public official under investigation for sexual ha-
rassment was valid and the enforcement thereof 
did not violate Art. 10), and Barfod v. Denmark, 
App. No. 11508/85 (Feb. 22, 1989) (civil judgment 
based on personal attack on reputation of lay per-
son members of tax tribunal was valid and the en-
forcement thereof did not violate Art. 10). 
 
Allegedly illegal comments or statements must be 
considered in the context of the work as a whole, 
and the circumstances in which the statements 
were made.  See Gozel (journalist should not be 
punished for merely publishing the statements of 
a third party without adding any additional 
statements or opinions that might be considered 
illegal); Alinak (fictional account of events that al-
legedly took place should not be punished when 
there is no reference to any real person); Sener 
(statements made in a weekly review that were 
critical of the government should be viewed in the 
context of the essential role of the press in ensur-
ing the proper functioning of a political democra-
cy); Lingens (same); Polat (although critical of the 
government, the statements in question pertained 
to events in the past and were acceptable criticism 
of the government). 
 
An essential element to consider is whether the 
expression in question could reasonably incite vi-
olence or be considered hate speech.  See Gozel 
(statements advocating for hunger strikes, al-
though critical of the government, did not incite 
others to violent behavior and should be pro-
tected); Alinak (overall hostile tone and graphic 
images may incite violence if taken literally, but 
in the context of a work of fiction, it would appeal 
to a smaller audience and not be as dangerous); 
Sener (although the writing expressed anger at 
the government, it was an intellectual work and 
not intended or likely to incite violence); Polat (li-
terary work based on events in the past unlikely 
to incite violent behavior in the present day).  
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While prior restraints do not violate Art. 10 per 
se, prior restraints are subject to much more care-
ful scrutiny, and a restraint on future expression 
as a punishment for previous acts is improper.  
See Nur Radyo (six-month ban on broadcasting 
based on a history of past violations which had 
been the subject of other sanctions was not com-
patible with the rule of law); Gozel (one-month 
ban on publication for publishing article accusing 
the government of being a fascist dictatorship and 
advocating hunger strikes was an improper pu-
nishment and a violation of Art. 10); Karademirci 
v. Turkey, 44 E.H.R.R. (2007) (statute requiring 
any association making a statement to the press 
to file a copy of the statement with the public 
prosecutor‘s office prior to making the statement 
was improper because it did not adequately ad-
dress what types of activity could lead to criminal 
prosecution, and the current prosecution was not, 
therefore, properly prescribed by law); Alinak 
(seizure of all first editions of a fictional novel be-
fore dissemination was disproportionate especially 
when the contents of the novel were considered in 
context); Sener (editor‘s suspended sentence for a 
previous action had the effect of a prior restraint 
because the threat of a hefty penalty had the ef-
fect of restricting the applicant‘s work as an editor 
and reducing her ability to offer the public infor-
mation it had a right to receive). 
 
These examples demonstrate the method of explanatory synthesis, but 
they appear naked in the absence of a section of discourse applying the 
induced principles to the facts of a client‘s case.  The ―E‖—
Explanation—section using explanatory synthesis would in legal 
discourse be followed by an ―A‖—Application—section applying the 
principles to the client‘s facts.  The E section would be drafted to 
educate and persuade the audience as to the proper interpretation and 
application of the law, and would be crafted to focus on the principles 
that would be necessary for a determination or adjudication of the 
client‘s issues.  In short, the E and the A section would be crafted using 




                         
54  Section VI is derived in large part from the Socratic dialogue between 
Socrates, Ireacus, and Treatis featured in Murray, Rule Synthesis and 
Explanatory Synthesis, 8 LEG. COM. & RHET. at 225-29 and 240-43, which 
discusses the rhetoric of explanatory synthesis and rule synthesis. 
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VI.  Explanatory Synthesis and Rule Synthesis in Legal Rhetoric 
 
 A. The Rhetoric of Rule Synthesis 
In classical rhetoric, rule synthesis is used primarily as a topic of 
invention and secondarily as a topic of arrangement.
55
  The invention 
fits the analysis of multiple authorities into a syllogistic structure 
meeting logos objectives of the communication.  It also is a topic of 
arrangement involving open demonstration of the analysis—showing 
your work, so to speak—which furthers the ethos objectives of the 
analysis and communication.56  The structure of a proof—syllogistic 
structure—is persuasive both substantively and rhetorically.  
Substantively, it reveals the components of the analysis—the major 
and the minor premises—to examination and refutation.  This is the 
concept of falsifiability.
57
  If the openly demonstrated analysis is not 
refuted, it is held to be conclusive when the premises are capable of 
conclusive determination; in other words, the proof is absolute when 
both premises are absolutely and necessarily true, as in a true 
syllogism. When the premises are not susceptible to conclusive 
determination, as in most instances of legal analysis where the facts 
and the law are not susceptible to absolute certainty of determination, 
the syllogistic structure still is held to be highly persuasive because the 
premises are openly demonstrated and exposed to examination and 
refutation both as to the probability and accuracy of the statement of 
the premises and the probability and reliability of the conclusion 




Rule synthesis is a form of open demonstration of the analysis of 
                         
55  Murray, Rule Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis, 8 LEG. COM. & 
RHET. at 225. 
56  The structural form of pure logic and scientific or mathematical proof 
is the syllogism, while the structural form of rhetorical demonstration and 
legal argument is the enthymeme. See ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, bk. I, ch. 1, 
at 1355a (W. Rhys Roberts & Ingram Bywater trans., Random House 1954). 
In an enthymeme, a highly probable construction of the applicable legal 
principles is applied to a highly probable construction of the specific 
circumstances of the case at hand so as to describe a highly probable 
conclusion or prediction about the application. Id.  See also Murray, Rule 
Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis, 8 LEG. COM. & RHET. at 225. 
57  Murray, Rule Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis, 8 LEG. COM. & 
RHET. at 226. 
58  Id. at 226. 
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examples (authorities) that inform the major premise (the rules, legal 
standards) of the syllogistic structure of the enthymeme in legal 
reasoning.  It is falsifiable because the synthesis reveals the 
authorities that are synthesized. If the components of the analysis of 
the combinations of authorities and the principles induced from these 
combinations are not challenged or rebutted, the demonstration 
promotes persuasion from the logical arrangement, and it promotes 
credibility and benevolence from the frankness and candor of this form 
of demonstration.59 
 
In modern argument theory,60 rule synthesis involves coding the 
discourse through analysis of relevant authorities and places the 
analysis within the enthymatic structure of an argument of 
probabilities.  The syllogistic structure of the enthymeme in modern 
argument (or practical reasoning) constructs the most probable 
definition of the major premise of the argument, followed by the most 
probable statement of the facts and circumstances at hand in the 
problem and its rhetorical situation.  Rule synthesis, with its open and 
falsifiable rendering of the components of the analysis and the 
principles induced from the examination and combinations of the 
                         
59  In classical rhetoric, the example was the rhetorical companion of the 
induction, much in the same way that the enthymeme was the companion of 
the syllogism. Both forms, the example and the induction, seek to induce 
information—construct truth, if you will—from subjects or examples, the 
difference being that an induction uses absolute, conclusive truths about the 
genus and species principles that are demonstrated in the induction, and an 
example uses probability about the genus and species principles that are 
demonstrated in the example. See ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, bk. I, ch. 2 at 
1356b, bk. II, ch. 19 at 1392a–1392b.  See also Murray, Rule Synthesis and 
Explanatory Synthesis, 8 LEG. COM. & RHET. at 226-27. 
60  On modern argument theory, see Linda L. Berger, Of Metaphor, 
Metonymy, and Corporate Money: Rhetorical Choices in Supreme Court 
Decisions on Campaign Finance Regulation, 58 Mercer L. Rev. 949 (2007) 
(the corporate metaphor in modern argument theory); Linda L. Berger, What 
is the Sound of a Corporation Speaking? How the Cognitive Theory of 
Metaphor Can Help Lawyers Shape the Law, 2 J. ALWD 169 (2004) (use of 
metaphor in modern argument theory and cognitive studies); JEROME 
BRUNER & ANTHONY AMSTERDAM, MINDING THE LAW chs. 2–3, 6–7 (2002); 
CHAIM PERELMAN & LUCIE OLBRECHTS–TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A 
TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION (1969); Michael R. Smith, Rhetoric Theory and 
Legal Writing: An Annotated Bibliography, 3 J. ALWD 129, 139 (2006); 
Kathryn Stanchi, Persuasion: An Annotated Bibliography, 6 J. ALWD 75, 80–
81 (2009); FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF 
ARGUMENTATION THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS AND 
CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS (1996); STEPHEN TOULMIN ET AL., AN 
INTRODUCTION TO REASONING (2d ed. 1984). 
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components, creates a highly probable and thus highly persuasive 




In writing-as-a-process theory,62 rule synthesis involves the open 
demonstration of analysis through a systematic process of comparing 
and combining authorities to build meaning and comprehension of the 
author and her audience.  The process constructs the rule section—it 
defines the legal standards that govern the issue of the discourse for 
the benefit of the author and the audience.  The careful, open, and 
demonstrative process of rule synthesis allows the author to better 
understand the rules and their requirements, exceptions, and 
limitations, and in turn allows the audience to understand the same 
requirements, exceptions, and limitations of the rules defining the 
analysis and the discourse. The process of rule synthesis analysis is 
reflective and recursive, causing the author to revisit the same 
authorities multiple times to compare them and to induce from them 
different nuances of the meaning of the rules to best address the 
problem and its audience and rhetorical situation. This produces work 
that is both inventive and persuasive in bringing the audience to an 




Under discourse community theory,64 the process of reasoning through 
                         
61  See Murray, Rule Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis, 8 LEG. COM. 
& RHET. at 227-28. 
62  On writing-as-a-process theory, see Linda L. Berger, A Reflective 
Rhetorical Model: The Legal Writing Teacher as Reader and Writer, 6 Leg. 
Writing 57 (2000); Berger, New Rhetoric, supra note 20; Elizabeth Fajans & 
Mary R. Falk, Against the Tyranny of Paraphrase: Talking Back to Texts, 78 
Cornell L. Rev. 163 (1993); Leigh Hunt Greenhaw, ―To Say What the Law Is‖: 
Learning the Practice of Legal Rhetoric, 29 Val. U. L. Rev. 861 (1995); Carol 
McCrehan Parker, Writing Throughout the Curriculum: Why Law Schools 
Need It and How to Achieve It, 76 Neb. L. Rev. 561 (1997); Teresa Godwin 
Phelps, The New Legal Rhetoric, 40 Sw. L.J. 1089 (1986); Smith, supra note 
57, at 141. 
63  See Murray, Rule Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis, 8 LEG. COM. 
& RHET. at 228. 
64
  On modern discourse community theory, see Brook K. Baker, 
Language Acculturation Process and the Resistance to In―doctrine‖ation in 
the Legal Skills Curriculum and Beyond: A Commentary on Mertz‗s Critical 
Anthropology of the Socratic, Doctrinal Classroom, 34 John Marshall L. Rev. 
131 (2000); Susan L. DeJarnatt, Law Talk: Speaking, Writing, and Entering 
the Discourse of Law, 40 Duq. L. Rev. 489 (2002); Pollman, supra n. 9; J. 
Christopher Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A Revised View, 69 
Wash. L. Rev. 35 (1994); Smith, supra n. 57, at 143; Kathryn M. Stanchi, 
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synthesis to inform the major premise—the R section—of the analysis 
has become the accepted and expected structure and process of 
analysis within the legal writing discourse community. Rule synthesis 
devotes attention to the proper authorities based on their rank in the 
hierarchy of judicial authority accepted by the legal writing discourse 
community. Rule synthesis also follows the discourse community‘s 
expectations that a combination of authorities must be used to make a 
single coherent statement of the applicable legal principles that govern 




 B.  The Rhetoric of Explanatory Synthesis 
 
Explanatory synthesis has all of the rhetorical advantages of rule 
synthesis and quite a few other advantages over direct case-to-case 
analogical reasoning.  Rule synthesis meets modern argument theory 
objectives of practical reasoning through an inductive method to 
inform the major premise of the syllogistic argument form. 
Explanatory synthesis follows a similar method of inductive reasoning 
to construct the most probable explanation of how the rules apply to 
varying factual situations in multiple authorities. Explanatory 
synthesis, with its open and falsifiable induction of interpretive 
principles from a sample set of controlling authorities creates a highly 
probable and thus highly persuasive argument concerning the 




In writing-process theory, explanatory synthesis involves the open 
demonstration of analysis through a systematic process of comparing 
and combining authorities to build meaning and comprehension of the 
author and her audience regarding the various ways the rules interact 
with the facts of cases and the public policies of the area of law. The 
process constructs the explanation section—it defines the principles of 
interpretation and application that will govern the application of the 
rules to the issue for the benefit of the author and the audience. The 
careful, open, and demonstrative process of explanatory synthesis 
allows the author to better understand the application of the rules and 
how this implicates the public policies of the area and the values of the 
                                                                   
Resistance is Futile: How Legal Writing Pedagogy Contributes to the Law‗s 
Marginalization of Outsider Voices, 103 Dick. L. Rev. 7 (1998); Joseph M. 
Williams, On the Maturing of Legal Writers: Two Models of Growth and 
Development, 1 Leg. Writing 1 (1991). 
65  See Murray, Rule Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis, 8 LEG. COM. 
& RHET. at 229. 
66  Id. at 240-41. 
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audience, and in turn demonstrates these lessons for the education and 
persuasion of the audience. The process of explanatory synthesis 
analysis is reflective and recursive, causing the author to revisit the 
same authorities multiple times to compare them and to induce from 
them different nuances of the rules and policies, and to draw out the 
different narratives of success and failure under the applications of the 
rules. This reflective and recursive process constructs an explanation 
section that best addresses the problem and its audience and rhetorical 
situation. This produces work that is both inventive and persuasive in 





Under discourse-community theory, the process of reasoning through 
synthesis to inform the second half of the major premise—the E section 
of the analysis—is the accepted and expected structure and process of 
analysis within the legal writing discourse community. Explanatory 
synthesis devotes attention to the proper authorities based on their 
rank in the hierarchy of judicial authority accepted by that community. 
Explanatory synthesis can develop many and varied principles of 
interpretation—many more than direct analogical reasoning—because 
it can work with a much larger number of authorities, and weave them 
together so that the client‘s case can be analogized to whole groups of 





Explanatory synthesis as used in the TREAT format also is 
rhetorically advantageous under the newest school of contemporary 
rhetoric—law and economics.  The rhetorical canons of contemporary 
law and economics apply four topoi of invention and arrangement and 
four style tropes to legal discourse: the primacy of the forms of analysis 
of mathematics and science, the concept of law as a system of 
incentives and costs, the rhetorical theory of efficiency, and the 
rhetorical lessons of contemporary rational-choice theory.69 
 
The syllogistic and inductive structures of TREAT and explanatory 
synthesis are the same structures used in mathematical and scientific 
proof. The very concept that the components of a legal argument can be 
phrased in the form of an induction and a syllogism taking the form of 
a proof enhances the persuasiveness of the discourse. This is both 
                         
67  Id. at 241. 
68  Id. at 241-42. 
69
  Id. at 242. 
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rhetorically advantageous and substantively advantageous because the 
power of the mathematical and scientific forms of proof lies in their 
open demonstration of the steps and components of the analysis in a 
transparent and falsifiable presentation.70  Explanatory synthesis 
further incorporates the advantages of mathematics and science by 
increasing the number of authorities that can efficiently be analyzed in 
the discourse and from which the principles of interpretation can be 
induced, thus increasing the reliability of the analysis. Explanatory 
synthesis in effect increases the number—the ―n‖—of the sample set, 
which increases the reliability and persuasiveness of the principles 
induced from that sample set. Because the method allows for 
exposition of many interpretive principles using multiple authorities in 
a comparatively small amount of space (roughly one-third to one-half 
page per synthesis, depending on the number of authorities 
synthesized and the length and complexity of the parentheticals 
required), explanatory synthesis provides an elegant solution to the 
rhetorical problem of the client‘s situation, which is preferred by 
mathematics and science.71 
 
Explanatory synthesis performs an open demonstration of the analysis 
of multiple authorities as an incentive to the reader. The reader is 
invited to avoid the cost of delving into such a large number of 
authorities because the work of the analysis has been performed openly, 
subject to examination and refutation. Opaque or unsubstantiated 
reasoning, overworking or stretching an analogy to a precedent that is 
not closely aligned to the client‘s narrative and rhetorical situation, 
imposes a cost on the reader who must take the time to unpack the 
analogy, evaluate whether it is analogous, and still might have to 
invest the time to compare the analogy to other controlling authorities 




Explanatory synthesis is efficient in its method of using a greater 
number of authorities to substantiate and apply a greater number of 
interpretive principles to make a more persuasive discourse. It also 
allows for the demonstration of patterns of narratives and storylines 
found in more than one authority so as to appeal to the values and 
preferences of the modern, rational audience. The typical legal 
audience is prone to the same biases and heuristics as any audience of 
decision-makers, and explanatory synthesis creates opportunities to 
                         
70
  Id. 
 
71
 Id. at 242-43. 
72  Id. at 243. 
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anticipate and target audience biases or shortcuts. Explanatory 
synthesis, compared to direct analogical reasoning, does not put all of 
the rhetorical eggs in one or two baskets by relying on the principles of 
interpretation and application that can be learned from one or two 
precedents. It can present a series of interpretive principles to address 
many different audiences and situations, and support the principles 




VII.  Conclusion 
 
Rule synthesis is the evaluation and analysis of controlling authorities 
on a legal issue to derive the actual rules that govern a legal issue.  
Rule synthesis is the process of analysis to determine what the law is 
that governs an issue.  Explanatory synthesis examines concrete, 
specific examples of situations (cases) where the rules have been 
applied to produce a concrete outcome in order to induce principles and 
illustrations about how the law works in various relevant situations.  
Explanatory synthesis seeks not to determine what the law is but 
rather how the law works in these relevant situations in order to make 
reliable, persuasive predictions about how the law will work in future 
situations where the applicable rules will be applied. 
 
In comparative perspective, rule synthesis is derived from the Common 
Law doctrine of precedent and the principle of stare decisis, and, 
therefore, it is has a more limited application in civilian legal analysis.  
But explanatory synthesis is applicable to both systems of legal 
analysis and persuasion because it is based on logical induction of 
principles and illustrations from cases, not to define the controlling 
rules but to demonstrate and illustrate how the rules work so as to 
make reliable, persuasive predictions about how the rules will work in 
future situations.  The principles induced and illustrated in 
explanatory synthesis do not depend on the doctrines of precedent and 
stare decisis but on a more fundamental rhetorical assumption shared 
by common law and civil law legal analysis: that courts and tribunals 
do not act randomly and capriciously, and that rulings over time are 
reliable for anticipating future rulings in future situations.  In this way, 
explanatory synthesis is a method of analysis and rhetoric that 
partners well with the common law doctrine of precedent and the civil 
law doctrine of jurisprudence constante.
74
  The principles induced 
through explanatory synthesis are not perfect in the sense of syllogistic, 
                         
73  Id.  
74  See sources cited in notes 8-10, supra.  
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mathematical proof, but are reliable and persuasive in the nature of 
scientific induction in modern legal rhetoric.  
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